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1. Overview 
Social protection and taxation have emerged as two of the key policy instruments 
available to governments in the pursuit of the Financing for Development (FFD) goals and 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). There is a growing recognition among policy makers 
in the international development context of the powerful role fiscal policy plays in shaping 
development outcomes. This represents an important opportunity for the closer consideration of 
the ways in which taxation and social protection operate jointly in practice (Bastagli, 2015a). 
Developing countries often struggle to generate government revenues for social 
protection through taxation and social security contributions. Tax authorities tend to be 
weak and taxation lack transparency, while a relatively large share of the population is employed 
in the informal sector, making it difficult and costly to collect social security contribution or tax 
employees. This limits the means to redistribute income and to develop adequate social 
protection systems to reduce poverty and inequality (ILO, 2016).  
The removal of ineffective tax subsidy policies (e.g. Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Oman, etc.) 
and taxes on financial transactions (e.g. Brazil) may provide the necessary funds to 
launch/expand social protection programmes. Further, taxes on natural resources in 
resource-rich countries can support social spending and generate overall economic growth. 
The evidence from countries like Bolivia, Brazil, and Zambia (i.e. case studies noted in Section 3) 
shows the positive socio-economic effects that natural resource extraction can have. 
This rapid literature review looks at reports issued by different development agencies; 
international financial institutions; government bureaus and some academic publications – 
regarding different social protection/social security programmes and how different tax policies 
and tax reforms have been used in their financing. 
Some of the key findings from different developing countries (i.e. in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region and elsewhere) on how social protection programmes financed are through 
various tax instruments and revenue sources (e.g. tax on natural resources, tax on financial 
transactions, elimination of tax subsidies, etc.) have been summarized below: 
 In Brazil, Flexibly Financial Transactions Taxes have been utilized to create revenues for 
public provisioning of social services. These taxes: 
o have a twin objective of raising revenues whilst deterring financial speculation 
that has insignificant social value – and yet presents high risks to the economy; 
o are simple to administer – with no new-found institutions required; 
o can be very progressive, since they let resources to be fed directly from the 
formal economy to those who require social protection; 
o have been a substantial source of tax revenue. 
 In Mongolia, several initiatives have been introduced to reallocate wealth created from 
natural resources to citizens.  
o Different Sovereign Wealth Funds created by the government (e.g. Windfall 
Profits Taxes on natural resources) supported children and families through a 
universal child benefit scheme. 
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 Similarly, in Zambia, expenditures on social protection have been financed through a 
well-designed tax system on natural resource extracting companies; legislations to fight 
underreporting of mineral earnings and capital flight as well as abolition of subsidies. 
o Health, education and social protection are focus areas to achieve SDGs. 
o Budget for social cash transfers has been expanded substantially. 
o Steps taken to develop a social protection policy with rights-based entitlements. 
 Bolivia has also been able to finance social protection expenditures through proceeds 
from natural resources (particularly hydrocarbons taxes).  
o New regulation on the distribution of hydrocarbon wealth has resulted in 
increased oil and gas income for the state – which has, conversely, been used to 
expand social protection. 
 Through a highly simplified tax collection scheme called Monotax, Uruguay has been 
able to formalize its informal economy (particularly micro and small enterprises) and 
broaden social protection coverage. 
The experience of countries in the MENA region also provides an interesting example on how to 
link social protection financing to taxes. To summarize some of these cases: 
 In Jordan, the reduction/removal of subsidies on different types of petroleum products 
has lowered the government’s fiscal burden and improved social protection coverage and 
delivery of large-scale social programmes – such as cash transfer scheme to vulnerable 
households. 
o However, there was some resistance towards reforms on progressive taxation 
and the lifting of subsidies. 
o Tax evasion also reduces the revenue to finance social protection. 
 In Egypt, a reform encompassing increase in taxes by the government and the 
termination of energy related tax subsidies (among other policies) has led to targeted 
social ‘solidarity’ programmes – including pension schemes, health care provision and 
education.  
o Nevertheless, rising poverty rates are a challenge. Recent reforms (higher taxes 
and cuts to subsidies) had a noticeable social cost too. 
o There are also challenges of coordination among agencies running social 
protection.  Social programmes also suffer from financial fragmentation. 
 Morocco dedicates a relatively low budget for social protection programmes – despite 
collecting a decent sized (over a third of its GDP) tax revenue. 
o Social protection system is also fragmented (involving more than 50 agencies), 
creating coordination problems and limiting success. 
 Oman has cut ineffective tax subsidies on different items and focuses on diversifying its 
economy (and source of tax) – away from oil. The country has also put a comprehensive 
social protection system in place; including universal medical care, programmes for 
disabled people, children, migrant workers, free/compulsory education, etc. 
 Algeria is striving to complement its social protection funding via taxes on tobacco, 
alcohol, and pharmaceutical imports. 
 Tunisia has carried out fragmented reforms on social protection. The government’s 
(fiscal) space for broader social protection reforms has been impeded by consumption 
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subsidies. However, there are potentials for a broad social protection reforms – on the 
back of reforming inefficient subsidies and passing pension reforms. 
 The experience of Sudan shows that MENA region’s unique religious institutions (e.g. 
obligatory Islamic wealth taxes and endowments – zakat and waqf) could be used to 
cover a significant portion of social protection expenditures. 
 
This brief report is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the link between social protection 
programmes and tax policies. Section 3 provides country examples on how different social 
protection programmes (e.g. health care, education, pension, targeted assistance programmes to 
vulnerable groups, cash transfers, etc.) have been financed through various types of tax 
instruments. To draw lessons, tax policies of interest and their impact (i.e. financing and 
development outcome) on social protection programmes are separately looked at. The section 
explores examples from developing countries (mostly middle income) in different parts of the 
world. Section 4 provides information and evidence that is similar to Section 3 – but focusing on 
the experiences of countries in the MENA region. 
2. Linking Social Protection Systems to Taxes 
Taxes and transfers are often discussed separately. However, in practice, they interact to 
influence the distribution and redistribution of income and wealth. When studies examine 
social protection independently from tax policy, they generate an incomplete picture of the impact 
of fiscal policy (Bastagli, 2015a; 2015b). Evidence showing that the net effects of government 
spending and taxes put the poor worse-off in some countries underlines the significance of 
implementing a comprehensive approach which includes both taxes and spending (e.g. see the 
experience of Jordan and other MENA countries in section 4). 
Taxation is depicted as one of the core policy options to raise the ‘significant additional 
domestic public resources’ that will be required to achieving the SDGs – according to the 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development 
(UN, 2015a). In this regard, donors’ commitments are mainly expressed in terms of delivering 
support to enhance domestic capacity for tax and revenue collection and administration. 
Taxation exhibits some key differentiating characteristics and potential advantages – 
when compared with other social protection financing alternatives, like expenditure 
reallocation and dependence on external financing. These consist of taxation’s potential role 
in creating and strengthening government legitimacy and state-citizen relations (UNRISD, 2019). 
By fostering government accountability, effective tax systems can be linked to a ‘virtuous cycle’, 
whereby tax collection is associated with enhanced service delivery and improved citizens’ 
willingness to pay taxes. (Bastagli, 2015a; 2015b). 
External financing and revenue earned from natural resources and consumption taxes 
have been crucial to backing the establishment or enlargement of social protection 
programmes. The relatively low average tax-to-GDP ratio in several developing countries partly 
explains the continued dependence on external financing for social protection programmes. 
Nevertheless, this also raises sustainability and equity fears. Such problems can be can be dealt 
with via initiatives targeted at strengthening countries’ institutional and administrative capacity for 
social protection, by safeguarding the transparent management of resources, and by creating tax 
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and transfer policies that address equity and broader development concerns – together with 
other policy objectives, like boosting tax revenue (Bastagli, 2015a). 
3. Case Studies: Financing Social Protection through 
Taxes (L. America, Asia, Africa) 
3.1 Brazil: Financing Social Protection through Financial 
Transaction Taxes  
Tax related policy developments  
Brazil presents a good example of how flexibly financial transactions taxes (FTTs) can be 
used to create revenues for public provisioning of social services, and at the same time to 
alleviate financial instability occurring from short-term capital flows. FTT is a small tax 
imposed on various types of financial instruments such as shares, bonds, foreign currency 
transactions, derivatives, and bank debits and credits. FTTs have a twofold goal of raising 
revenues while disincentivising short-term financial speculations that provide little social gain but 
present high risks to the economy. FTTs are easy to implement by tax authorities, with no need 
to build novel institutions. It can also be highly progressive, as it allows resources to flow directly 
from the formal economy to those in need of social protection (ILO, 2016). 
Brazil’s FTTs (i.e. bank debit taxes) have been a source of sizeable tax revenue. Brazil 
initially introduced a bank debit tax in 1993. However, it was short-lived as a result of changes in 
policy. The longest lasting bank debit tax – Contribuicao provisoria sobre movimentacao ou 
transmissao de valores e de creditos e direitos de natureza financiera (CPMF) – was put in place 
in 1997, with an initial rate of 0.20%. The rate rose slowly starting in 1999 (0.22%) to 0.38% in 
2002. Revenues collected from the CPMF was originally earmarked to finance healthcare 
programmes (0.2%), to fight poverty (0.1%) and for social assistance (0.08%). The CPMF 
generated almost USD20 billion per year. The CPMF collected about three times the amount of 
revenue raised by Brazil’s corporate income tax (CIT) on financial companies (ILO, 2016; 
Honohan and Yoder, 2010). 
Impact on Social Policy & Lessons Learned  
Since the CPMF was devised mainly to finance social protection expenditure and its 
method was classified as a ‘social contribution’. When the CPMF was in place, 42% of the 
revenue generated was spent on the public unified health system; 21% on social insurance; 21% 
on Bolsa Família (conditional cash transfers), and 16% on other social purposes. Total revenue 
from the CPMF amounted to 1.4% of GDP by 2007. This was sufficient to cover the total cost of 
Bolsa Família and other non-contributory social protection programmes in Brazil. This signifies a 
major example of how other developing countries can generate their own revenue to help finance 
public services. Between the early 1990s and 2008 (i.e. when notable legislative and 
programmatic changes were made in Brazil around economic and social policy), the Gini 
coefficient (i.e. measure of income inequality) fell by 5.2 points and the percentage of households 
living below the poverty line halved. Socio-economic reforms in this period included increasing 
the minimum wage and public expenditure on health, education, and other social services (ILO, 
2016; Saad-Filho, 2015). 
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FTTs serve a dual purpose (i) to promote certain types of market behaviour (such as 
longer-term investments), and (ii) as a revenue generation mechanism. Nevertheless, 
Brazil’s sporadic episodes with FTTs display the resistance that such taxes can face from vested 
interests, notably in the powerful financial sector (ILO, 2016; Honohan and Yoder, 2010). 
Brazil symbolizes an essential example of an FTT regime in a developing country context, 
especially in those with a sizeable financial sector. This may, for example, offer some 
example to the MENA region – which mainly constitutes of upper and lower middle-income 
countries (see section 4). FTTs are easier to administer, as technological progress has made 
such tax collection much easier. Many developing countries have already applied some form of 
financial transactions, and the IMF thinks that such taxes can create substantial revenues (ILO, 
2016). 
 
3.2 Mongolia: Financing Social Protection Through Resource 
Revenues  
Tax (resource revenue) related policy developments  
Mongolia is an example of a country that has lately started to take more advantage of its 
immense natural resources. Mongolia’s development has been prompted by its extraction 
industry revenues. The government has made substantial efforts to guarantee that the wealth 
generated from its natural resources is divided among the wider population, and that resources 
are targeted at social protection programmes – such as the Universal Child Money programme 
(ILO, 2016). 
Impact on Social Policy & Lessons Learned  
Numerous initiatives have been launched in Mongolia during the last decade, reallocating 
wealth generated by natural resources to the wider population.  
 The Mongolian Development Fund (MDF): In July 2006, the government launched 
universal child benefits. Simultaneously, Windfall Profits Taxes were introduced to retain 
a higher share of mining profits. All revenues collected from natural resource extraction 
(dividends & 70% of royalties) entered the newly created Mongolian Development Fund 
(MDF). This was the government’s first effort to create a sovereign wealth fund. The fund 
had the aim of stabilising unscheduled budget deficits; undertook investments aiming at 
boosting domestic economic capacity; backing small and medium enterprises and 
helping children and families through the universal child benefit scheme. The MDF was 
the Government`s first attempt to legislate the link between government resource 
receipts and cash transfers. In January 2007, the MDF considerably increased the 
annual benefit amount of the universal Child Money programme (ILO, 2016; Moran, 
2013). 
 
 The Human Development Fund (HDF): In 2009, following the 2008 elections and after 
the initial instability of the financial crisis that also deeply affected natural resource prices, 
the MDF was supplanted by the Human Development Fund (HDF). The mandate of the 
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Fund, like the previous one, was to build and grow sustainable resources for better 
income distribution among the population. The HDF had the same function as the MDF 
but on a much bigger scale. The legislation did not restrict benefits and included health 
insurance and pensions, housing payments, cash, and medical and education service 
payments. The new schemes under the HDF were large and came under budgetary 
pressure after revenue income did not meet expenses. The fund was momentarily 
substituted by a targeted poverty benefit programme (ILO, 2016; Moran, 2013). Recently, 
the Government has created two sovereign wealth funds to maintain the country’s 
mineral wealth. The Fiscal Stability Fund is a risk fund designed to lessen revenue 
swings related to mining. The Future Heritage Fund is a savings fund aimed at 
preserving mineral wealth for future generations (Baatarzorig et al., 2019).  
 
Mongolia was, therefore, successful in redistributing some of the recent wealth generated from 
its extractive industry through social protection programmes. Key lessons learned (e.g. for other 
resource rich countries in the MENA region and elsewhere) include: 
 Countries rich in natural resources can improve their social protection system (and lower 
poverty rates) via the taxation of their natural resources, expanding government revenue, 
and broadening of social protection programmes.  
 Improvements of transparency and operational efficiency on all levels of the government 
will support the allocation of funds to social expenditures.  
 Setting up a stabilisation fund helps in balancing volatility in government revenues as a 
result of natural resource price variations. 
 
3.3 Zambia: Financing Social Protection Through Mineral Taxes 
Tax (resource revenue) related policy developments  
Zambia is another example of how countries with rich natural resources can rely on 
taxation (particularly on regulated natural resource extracting private companies) to 
improve social protection services – as well as to lessen inequality and poverty (ILO, 
2016). Zambia’s mining sector accounted for 9% of GDP and 77% of exports (as of 2015). In 
2013, Zambia’s annual extractive revenue was USD1.5 billion and this represented 30% of total 
government revenue (ILO, 2016).  
The country was characterised by generous concessions for private sector companies, 
and ineffective management under the state ownership in the pre-2008 period. Since then, 
Zambia has introduced various measures to increase efficiency and to widen the base for 
its government revenue. Zambia applied institutional reforms, such as the creation of a large 
taxpayers’ office, and a gradual strengthening of its revenue collection framework. Tax 
administration is now relatively effective, and the country substantially reduced tax leakages 
when compared with other African countries (Chamber of Mines of Zambia and ICMM, 2014).  
The Zambian Government has also enacted a legislation to curtail capital flight (i.e. large 
outflow of financial assets) and the underreporting of mineral earnings in 2013. The law 
applies to all international transactions, including profits, dividends, remittances, loans to non-
residents and investments abroad by persons dwelling in Zambia. Excluding petroleum 
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producers, Zambia’s mining receipts (as a share of GDP) are the second highest after Botswana 
(ILO, 2016). 
Impact on Social Policy & Lessons Learned  
The government of Zambia underscores health, education and social protection as a 
means to achieve their SDGs. Recent government budgets confirm the government’s increase 
in spending on health, education and social protection. Moreover, the government has enlarged 
the budget for social cash transfer schemes substantially in recent years. These considerable 
shifts in Social Protection Spending can be linked to both a change in leadership, as well as to an 
enhanced fiscal position that has been enabled through substantially increased government 
revenues from natural resource taxation. Additionally, the government has taken steps towards 
developing a social protection policy with rights-based entitlements and has generated additional 
fiscal space for social protection by eliminating fuel and maize miller subsidies. Former 
patrimonial social protection programmes have also been reformed to more structured and 
transparent programmes (ILO, 2016).  
The lesson from Zambia exemplifies that resource-rich developing countries can 
considerably expand fiscal space for social protection and other socio-economic 
expenditures. Taxing natural resource extracting industries permitted the Zambian government 
to enhance their fiscal position and created the basis for the broadening of their social protection 
system.  
 
3.4 Bolivia: Financing Social Protection Through Hydrocarbons 
Taxes 
Tax (resource revenue) related policy developments  
Natural resources (including gold, tin, petroleum and gas) are the mainstay of Bolivia’s 
wealth and are crucial to funding the country’s social protection policies as well as in 
realizing national development. Due to orthodox neoliberal policies in the 1980s, most of the 
production was privatised, usually through foreign companies (ILO, 2017). In the process, royalty 
taxes were reduced to 18%, which led to very high profits for producers (82%) and very low 
returns to Bolivians. The pervasive discontent with this situation led to an activist campaign 
named “Hydrocarbons are No Longer Ours.” After violent repression of this movement during the 
so-called “Gas Wars”, President Sánchez de Lozada resigned. Following that, a national 
referendum led to a new regulation on the distribution of hydrocarbon wealth. The previous share 
of 82% of oil revenues for the producers and 18% for the state was equalised at a 50-50 split 
(and a reversed 82-18 split for the largest gas field). Renegotiation of former contracts resulted in 
an increase in oil and gas income for the state from USD558 million in 2004 to USD1.53 billion in 
2006 (ILO, 2017). 
Impact on Social Policy & Lessons Learned  
The significant revenue increases (following reforms and renegotiations) allowed the 
government to expand/sustain social policies such as Renta Dignidad (Dignity Rent), a non-
contributory pension to all Bolivians over 60 years old, or the Bono Juancito Pinto, a cash 
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transfer for all children in public elementary schools, which counterbalances the costs of 
transportation, books and uniforms to increase school attendance (ILO, 2017; Duran-Valverde 
and Pacheco, 2012; UNCTAD, 2014). 
3.4 Uruguay: Financing Social Protection Through Monotax 
Tax (resource revenue) related policy developments  
Monotax is a simplified tax collection/payment scheme for small contributors in Uruguay. 
The micro- and small entrepreneurs who join the scheme are directly entitled to the benefits of 
the contributory social security system (except for unemployment protection). Monotax 
contributions are gathered by the Uruguayan Social Security Institute (BPS), and the share 
corresponding to tax payments is transferred by the BPS to the fiscal authority. The remaining 
share is then used by the BPS to fund social security benefits for social insurance members, 
linked to the scheme and their families.  
Impact on Social Policy & Lessons Learned  
Monotax has proven to be an effective instrument to formalize micro- and small 
enterprises, as well as to extend social security coverage to independent workers, 
especially women. Following its success in Uruguay, schemes similar to Monotax are being 
developed in Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador (ILO, 2014; ILO, 2017). 
4. Case Studies: Financing Social Protection through 
Taxes (MENA Region)  
National level governance reforms are required in MENA countries to pave the way for the 
future development of social protection policies. At the moment, social insurance benefits 
are fragmented, with numerous schemes running in any one country – and this leads to resource 
wastage. Fiscal space (e.g. government revenue) is not as big a challenge in the Arab region – 
unlike other countries around the world, since average social spending varies between 7% and 
12% of GDP. In addition, most Arab countries are in the lower or upper middle-income range. 
This suggests that there could be a better role for effective tax and transfer policies that can 
deliver a funding base for poverty-reduction policies (UNDP, 2014). If one considers that at least 
10% of GDP goes towards food and fuel subsidies, which are not the best forms of redistribution 
or poverty reduction, then it is conceivable to redistribute spending towards more direct poverty-
reduction policies (Silva, 2012; UNRISD, 2012; Behrendt, 2013; UNDP, 2014).  
 
4.1 Jordan 
Tax (subsidy) related policy developments  
Similar to other countries in the MENA region, Jordan has traditionally provided tax 
subsidies for consumables such as fuel, electricity, gas, and food. Since the 1960s, the 
Jordanian government has shielded its citizens from unpredictable global prices of commodities 
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and food – beginning with subsidies for wheat and sugar (Atamanov et al., 2015). Subsidies on 
petroleum products alone constituted close to 9% of government expenditures, and as much as 
2.8% of GDP in 2012 (Atamanov et al. 2015). The fiscal burden of subsidies was unsustainable, 
and in 2012 the government either reduced or eliminated subsidies for various categories of fuel. 
Simultaneously, the government introduced a large-scale cash transfer scheme to vulnerable 
households as compensation (UNRISD, 2018).  
Impact on Social Policy & Lessons Learned  
Jordan provides various assistance programmes that range from tax subsidies to cash transfer 
schemes, tax exemptions, and social services. The country is considered to have one of the 
strongest social protection programmes and health care systems in the MENA region 
(UNRISD, 2018).   
 Most public (non-contributory) social protection and poverty alleviation programmes are 
delivered by the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD). Beneficiaries of these schemes 
include children, young people, vulnerable households, victims of human trafficking, older 
persons and persons with disabilities. Even if MoSD’s mandate includes coordinating 
social services for all citizens, the law does not specify an entity in charge of developing 
policy for social protection (Zureiqat and Shama 2015). This creates some difficulty in 
coordinating benefits and programmes among various social protection actors.   
 The National Aid Fund (NAF) is a financially and administratively autonomous section of 
MoSD. It provides benefits and financial assistance to vulnerable individuals and 
households. NAF counted a total of 99,394 beneficiary households or almost 8% of the 
Jordanian population in 2015 (Röth et al., 2017). Nevertheless, just 24% of food insecure 
and vulnerable households are estimated to have received aid from NAF. This leaves more 
than 76% of households in need without coverage. This issue has led to calls for an 
improved targeting of beneficiaries (Zureiqat and Shama, 2015).  
 The National Zakat Fund (which is administered by the Ministry of Awqaf, Islamic Affairs 
and Holy Places) runs an additional social protection programme through cash and in-kind 
assistance (Röth et al., 2017). The Zakat Fund is based on donations, as Zakat is 
considered a religious duty for Muslims whose wealth exceeds a certain limit and entails 
donating 2.5% of one’s wealth.  
 The Social Security System is the largest social insurance scheme in the country. Yet, it 
only covers approximately 20% of the estimated 4.5 million working age adults in Jordan 
and does little to lessen the problem of poverty among employees. Moreover, an estimated 
44% of workers are employed in the informal sector and are not covered by social 
protection schemes (ILO, 2013). 
 The education sector in Jordan is facing several challenges, including the arrival of huge 
numbers of Syrian refugee children. Integrating refugee children into existing primary 
education programmes is putting a strain on the country’s education system (USAID 2015).   
 Despite different challenges, Jordan is considered to have one of the most advanced and 
sophisticated health care systems in the region. In 2010, Jordan spent approximately 8.6% 
of GDP on health care (UNRISD, 2018). The government curtailed free health care 
services in 2014 and refugees now pay higher out-of-pocket expenses at the same rate as 
uninsured Jordanians (Achilli, 2015). Refugees also report facing hostility and 
discrimination from health care professionals (Groenveld and Abu-Taleb 2016; UNRISD, 
2018).  
Reforms involving progressive taxation (aimed at improving the redistribution of resources) and 
the lifting of subsidies (which often benefit the wealthy) have been met with public resistance. 
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Conversely, Jordan’s indirect taxes on goods and services (which are paid by all consumers 
regardless of income level) make up as much as 50% of tax revenues. This has a negative 
impact on poor and low-income households. In combination with high levels of tax evasion and 
avoidance, Jordan faces increasing levels of social inequality.   
The mixture of these challenges, and the cutbacks by the state to provisions of adequate 
services and social security, has caused protests and public discontent. In 2017, budget debates 
over tax hikes and spending cuts to meet the IMF Extended Fund Facility programme resulted in 
protests in Amman and other urban centres – despite the recent rise in minimum wage (World 
Bank, 2017).  
 
4.2 Egypt  
Tax (subsidy) related policy developments  
With the arrival of President Al Sisi in 2014, the current government started a series of 
drastic policy reforms, challenging the pre-existing social contract and moving away from 
universal to targeted social policies. Reforms include increased taxes, phasing out of energy 
subsidies and increased targeting mechanisms for food subsidies and cash transfer, and 
trimming of the public sector. Despite the heavy (social) cost of such reforms, the Al Sisi 
administration contended that there were no other options – if it was to avoid a serious macro-
economic crisis (Ghanem, 2014).  
Energy subsidy reform began in July 2014 and included gradual phasing out of subsidies, 
over a period of 5 years. Spending on food and energy subsidies and social protection reduced 
from 39% of public expenditure in 2014/2015 to 28.6% in 2015/2016, leading to an upsurge in 
fuel prices by nearly 70%, and in prices of natural gas by 175% (UNRISO, 2018). Half of the 
savings are allocated to the reform and enlargement of social safety nets (World Bank, 2015a).  
Impact on Social Policy & Lessons Learned  
Two targeted cash transfer programmes were unveiled by the Ministry of Social Solidarity 
in April 2015 – Takaful and Karama. Takaful (solidarity) is a conditional cash transfer 
programme delivering financial support to low-income families with school aged children (less 
than 18 years), while safeguarding their commitment to providing their children with healthcare 
and education (World Bank 2015a). The second programme, Karama (dignity), gives income 
support to the elderly and people with disabilities. The Karama programme supplants the old 
system of solidarity transfers/pensions, which ignored the beneficiary’s ability to work.  
 Since the share of pensions financed by the government primarily derives from indirect 
taxes, the current pension scheme is regressive (Loewe, 2009). Coverage is also modest 
given the incidence of informality in the Egyptian labour market (Du Pradel and Farida, 
2015).  
 Healthcare provision is based on several free services and a number of targeted 
insurance schemes (Handoussa, 2010). The current healthcare system is complex, 
fragmented, inequitable, and is in short of adequate financial resources. A new draft law 
on the reform of the health sector proposes the creation of a universal health insurance 
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system, where public and private hospitals offer their service on a competitive basis. The 
new scheme will be funded through contributions, co-payments and taxes on products 
harmful to health.  
 Education is free and will be allocated a share of public spending equivalent to at least 4% 
of the GNP (according to the 2014 constitution).  
Nearly two thirds of the state budget were allocated to social policies by previous regimes 
– mainly targeting the urban middle class. The economy was not creating enough 
employment opportunities and growth lacked inclusiveness. According to the World Bank 
(2015a), extreme poverty is increasing and close to half of all Egyptians are classified as “poor” 
or “vulnerable” due to (i) the lack of resources for health and education as well as (ii) due to 
unequal access to social security schemes because of informality. Poverty is also higher for 
women since they are mostly unemployed or employed in the informal sector. Fixing a minimum 
wage has failed to maintain a certain purchasing power (due to inflation). Private sector and 
short-term public sector employees also remain omitted from the minimum wage regulation.   
Numerous challenges are expected to limit the success of current policy reform. At the 
institutional level, insufficient horizontal coordination across sectors and agencies, shortage of 
qualified human resources, shortage of proper monitoring and evaluation are expected to affect 
the policy outcome. One key general challenge facing social policy in Egypt is the financial 
fragmentation of policies and programmes (UNRISO, 2018).   
  
4.3 Morocco   
Tax (subsidy) related policy developments  
Even though the proportion of tax revenue relative to GDP is well placed (at around 35%), 
the proportion of national budget devoted to social protection is among the lowest – when 
compared to countries in the same income group as Morocco.  The subsidies regime has worked 
an important part of the Moroccan social protection system for decades. It was intended to 
protect the population’s purchasing power in terms of food and fuel products such as sugar, flour, 
butane gas and different types of fuel. Due to the raise of food prices since early 2000s, the 
subsidies system has been criticised for its huge costs and for failing to address social inequities. 
It mainly benefited the middle classes and high-income groups in addition to supply chain 
corporations – instead of the poor and the vulnerable population (see Chen et al., 2014).  
Impact on Social Policy & Lessons Learned  
The Moroccan social protection system is split between relatively limited social insurance 
coverage and attempts of extension to reach those who have the means to contribute, and 
large-scale social assistance programmes. Some examples include unemployment insurance 
and the health insurance extension to independent workers and students that took place recently 
(UNRISD, 2018).   
 The contributory element of the social protection system in Morocco encompasses the 
employees of Public and Private sector. These represent only a third of the population 
enrolled in the formal employment sector. It insures primarily sickness, maternity leave, 
disability, old age, death, and unemployment as well as family benefits. Work related 
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accidents have been covered since 2002. Unemployment benefit is put in place since 2014. 
The public sector employees are covered through the Caisse Nationale des Organismes 
de prévoyance sociale (CNOPS) whereas the private sector employees (and theoretically 
liberal professions) are covered through Caisse Nationale de Sécurité sociale (CNSS). In 
general, the social insurance system in Morocco is fragmented along numerous 
dimensions – including financing, delivery and management processes (UNRISO, 2018). 
Social protection is generally limited in coverage. Contribution based social security is 
accessible to less than 20% of the employed population in Morocco. Despite the limited 
coverage, costs are high. Social protection expenditure represents about 6.57% of the GDP, 
including health expenditure and 4.51% out of GDP excluding health expenditure in 2014 
(UNRISO, 2018).   
Despite the expansions of coverage in recent years, social assistance is still fragmented, 
poorly coordinated and suffers from important targeting defects. A recent review of the 
social protection programmes in the country showed that more than 50 institutions are involved 
in all the programmes, including both social security and social assistance (see Ministry of 
General and Economic Affairs and UNICEF, 2016). The institutions are working in isolation 
from each other, despite efforts to improve coordination. Nevertheless, effectiveness and 
efficiency levels remain low, missing the opportunity to reach better results with the same or 
fewer resources. The review notes that the approach followed is fixated on certain categories of 
vulnerable individuals (instead of households), making it difficult to include some groups like 
young children; children out of schools; informal sector workers; unqualified youth, and elderly 
people who have never worked in the formal sector. Such risks were magnified in the rural areas 
when compared to their urban counterparts (UNRISO, 2018).   
4.4 Oman  
Tax (subsidy) related policy developments  
The Government gives tax subsidies to producers of various important items.  Owing to a 
slump in oil prices, tax breaks were cut back on various food items by 48% in the first quarter of 
2015. It was said that the subsidies were ineffective because they did not target the poor. To 
lessen reliance on revenue from oil, the diversification of the economy has become the main 
concern for the Omani government. In addition, the government has adopted the SDGs as a key 
framework for devising new social policies (UNRISD, 2018).  
Impact on Social Policy & Lessons Learned  
Oman has a comprehensive social protection system. Consequently, a wide range of basic 
services are accessible, such as access to insurance against old age, disability and death, 
maternity, health care, and education. Significant investments have led to large social 
development progress. These include substantial decreases in child mortality rates.  
 Oman has a system of nearly free, universal medical care, based largely on public sector 
providers.  All healthcare services were free at the point of delivery until 1996. However, 
given the burden on the government budget, a small fee was subsequently introduced. In 
2001 Oman spent about 3.66% of GDP on social protection and health care. Roughly 
90% of the population is covered by universal health care services (ILO, 2011).  
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 The Government of Oman has signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities in 2008 and ratified it in 2009. People with disabilities are given the right to 
preventive and rehabilitation health services, education, vocational rehabilitation, work, 
and participation in social, cultural and sports activities. In 2010, it was estimated that 
3.2% of the Omani population was affected by disabilities (UNRISD, 2018). 
 There are specialized programmes in place for children – such as community-based 
rehabilitation and home visits. Furthermore, there are three specialist centres for the 
education of children with difficulties seeing, hearing, or speaking and 300 schools with 
integrated provision for children with special needs. Oman has tried to make education 
more inclusive by adopting the National Strategy for the Disabled. The government 
(together with UNICEF) determined two strategic areas in the Country Programme 2012-
2015: (1) early childhood learning, care and development; and (2) child-centred, inclusive 
strategies and plans.  
 Education is both compulsory and free.  In 2014, Early Childhood Development (ECD) 
standards were put in place, as part of the National Action Plan on Early Childhood 
Education, thereby empowering Oman to promote a multi-faceted approach to early 
childhood.  This involves nutrition, since Oman suffers from persistent nutrition 
challenges regarding young children. To raise awareness and behaviour change and 
reduce malnutrition in children under the age of five, UNICEF and the Ministry of Health 
launched the ‘Child Nutrition Campaign’ in 2011. 
 A comprehensive pension system has been in place since 1992. It is overseen by the 
Ministry of Manpower, which provides old age, death and disability pensions to both 
public and private sector employees. The administration of the private sector segment 
comes under the Public Authority for Social Insurance (PASI).  This is a system of 
collective contribution between the government, employer and employee (PASI, 2014).  
 Social protection provisions also in place for temporary migrant workers. Short-term 
benefits include health care, work injury benefit, sick pay and maternity leave. Family 
benefits (e.g. health care and allowances) are non-compulsory (UNRISO, 2018).  
 
4.5 Algeria  
Tax related policy developments  
One way the Algerian Government augments social protection funding is via taxes on 
tobacco, alcohol, and pharmaceutical imports (ILO, 2017).  
 Taxes on Cigarettes and Alcohol: taxation on cigarettes was 50% of the price in 2014; 
in subsequent years, the Ministry of Finance put out new legislation placing additional 
taxes on alcohol and all tobacco products, a way to raising funds as well as combating 
unhealthy practices, such as drinking and smoking (ILO, 2017).  
 Taxes on Pharmaceutical Imports: Algeria introduced measures restricting imports of 
drugs in November 2008 – in order to shield jobs in the local pharmaceutical industry and 
boost tax revenues. A foreign-manufactured medicine cannot be imported if the same 
medicine is manufactured by at least three manufacturers in Algeria in quantities fulfilling 
the market demand. A new order of 8 May 2011 provided a list of 257 imported medicine 
that are taxed upon entry, because they are produced in sufficient quantities by national 
and foreign pharmaceutical companies in Algeria – this was argued to be a way to 
sustain jobs and national industry (ILO, 2017).  
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Impact on Social Policy & Lessons Learned  
Algeria has attained near universal social protection coverage, financed largely through 
social security contributions. Social security contributions are 35% of salaries; all employers 
must remit the workers’ contribution withheld at source at the rate of 9%, together with the 
employers’ contribution at the rate of 26%. Social security contributions fund pensions, family 
allowances, maternity, unemployment, work injury and health care for most Algerians. Though, 
additional funding is required for social assistance and schemes to cover the informal sector 
(WHO, 2015; ILO, 2017). 
 
4.6 Sudan  
Tax (religious) related policy developments  
Religious institutions such as zakat (i.e. obligatory wealth tax), waqf (i.e. endowments) 
and sadaqa (i.e. charitable donations) play an important role in Sudan and the wider MENA 
region – in the provision of social services, including social protection. Waqf is usually used for 
social services and community development, such as hospitals, schools and sanitations systems. 
Zakat and sadaqa contribute to the provision of social protection via cash and in-kind transfers. 
While sadaqa is a voluntary donation, zakat is a religious duty constituting one of the five pillars 
of Islam. It applies to all Muslim citizens who are above a certain wealth threshold.  
Payment of zakat was made compulsory by law in 1984. A subsequent law in 1986 
established the Sudanese Zakat Chamber – which is an independent chamber to separate zakat 
from other taxes. Finally, in 2001 the Zakat Act became the guiding document for zakat in the 
country, setting it as a socio-economic institution tasked with delivering social assistance (IPC-
IG, 2018). 
Impact on Social Policy & Lessons Learned  
The Sudanese Zakat Fund is among the biggest in the region. Zakat resources fund 87% 
of the social assistance supplied by the government (excluding subsidies), and some 2.6 
million households benefited from zakat in 2016 (Zakat Fund 2016). Beneficiaries are 
identified by local branches of the Zakat Fund using the poverty census database (Kjellgren et 
al., 2014; Turkawi 2015). Sudan, thus, offers one of the most notable examples of 
institutional efforts to integrate zakat into the national social protection system. 
 
4.7 Tunisia  
Tax (subsidy) related policy developments  
World Bank (2015b) notes that the pressures on fiscal space could be supported in the 
medium to long term by reforming the country’s inefficient consumption subsidies and the 
pension system. World Bank also argues that the financial savings from such reforms can be 
used to enhance coverage of social safety nets. 
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Impact on Social Policy & Lessons Learned  
Ever Since the 2011 revolution, there have been fragmented reforms in the sphere of 
social protection policies. The rationale of those measures was to lessen mounting social 
pressures and discontent. In this regard, for example, the government raised the amount of cash 
transfers and the overall number of beneficiaries.  
Ties between the economic and social policies are very weak in Tunisia – as the 
government considers social concerns as a residual matter in comparison to how important 
economic growth policies are. The content of social assistance programmes depends on the 
performance of macro-economic policies and economic growth. This weak coordination 
between social and economic policies has worsened after the revolution (UNRISD, 2018).   
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